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It is inevitable for networks to be invaded during op-
eration. The intrusion tolerance technology comes into 
being to enable invaded networks to provide the nec-
essary network services. This paper introduces an au-
tomatic learning mechanism of the intrusion tolerance 
system to update network security strategy, and derives 
an intrusion tolerance finite automaton model from an 
existing intrusion tolerance model. The proposed mod-
el was quantified by the Markov theory to compute the 
stable probability of each state. The calculated stable 
probabilities provide the theoretical guidance and basis 
for administrators to better safeguard network security. 
Verification results show that it is feasible, effective, 
and convenient to integrate the Markov model to the 
intrusion tolerance finite automaton.
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1. Introduction
Network security is commonly maintained by 
preventing network intrusions and repairing 
system loopholes through all means in a time-
ly and comprehensive manner. This common 
method is a passive strategy, owing to the dif-
ficulty in predicting network intrusions. Net-
work intrusion is largely inevitable, because 
the intrusion methods are constantly updated, 
and unknown system vulnerabilities are hard 
to find. In this context, network administrators 
must develop a mechanism to ensure that the 
network server can continue to provide network 
services after being invaded. The mechanism 
that enables the invaded network server to re-
pair itself while providing necessary services is 
called intrusion tolerance technology.
A system that adopts intrusion tolerance tech-
nology is known as a tolerance system. To de-
sign such a system, the premise is to recognize 
the presence of network intrusions in the sys-
tem. The system design needs to establish a 
sound mechanism that guarantees the continued 
operations of the core system functions after the 
invasion, provides timely remedies for invasion 
losses, and curbs the invasion as soon as pos-
sible, such that the system could resume the 
normal sate. Currently, the intrusion tolerance 
system is the third-generation core technolo-
gy of network security maintenance, serving 
as the last line of defense for network securi-
ty. Therefore, it is theoretically and practically 
significant to study the relevant mechanism of 
network intrusion tolerance system.
To date, many scholars have tried to imple-
ment intrusion tolerance system at home and 
abroad. Based on hidden semi-Markov model, 
Bang et al. [1] presented a detection scheme for 
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) signaling attacks 
on wireless sensor and actuator networks. The 
scheme could effectively differentiate between 
attack nodes and common nodes, and enhance 
the maintenance of intrusion tolerance. Cha and 
Kang [2] introduced a sequence classification 
method based on the hidden Markov model to 
misuse-based intrusion detection. Specifically, 
the system was treated as a statistical Markov 
model containing a set of observable states and 
a set of hidden states, and the model was used 
to effectively detect the intrusion behavior in 
the network, highlighting the keys in the main-
tenance of the tolerance system. To prevent ille-
gal intrusion into the network of large non-res-
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the system. The system will be more capable of 
resisting the APTs if the identified vulnerabili-
ties are solved.
To safeguard cloud computing networks, Nar-
wal et al. [24] combined Markov model with 
Markov game into a hybrid detection scheme for 
tolerance systems: the relevant state nodes were 
trained by training sequences, and the resource 
trajectories in the system were established with 
Wireshark network analyzer. In this way, the sus-
picious nodes were discovered to improve the 
system’s tolerance. Husák et al. [25] presented 
a continuous Markov-based recognition method 
to recognize the system intrusion intentions: the 
state nodes of the system were modeled by ma-
chine learning and data mining; the nodes that 
are most likely to be invaded were forecasted, 
and maintained to improve the overall security 
of the system. Singhal et al. [26] designed an 
intrusion tolerance detection method based on 
deep learning, which detects the intrusion nodes 
of the tolerance system through deep dictionary 
learning and deep transform learning, using the 
multi-label classification of deep learning. 
To overcome the difficulty in optimizing the 
training parameters of the Markov model, 
Chadza et al. [27] developed an AI intrusion 
tolerance detection model. By custom or default 
rules, the model gives off an alarm during the 
inspection of the DARPA 2000 MSA dataset. 
Experiments show that the AI model improves 
the detection rate of the intrusion tolerance sys-
tem by 44.95%. Sikder et al. [28] proposed a 
context-aware intrusion tolerance detection 
system. The system observes changes in a us-
er’s sensor data indifferent tasks, and creates a 
context model to distinguish benign from ma-
licious behaviors of sensors, thereby improv-
ing the security of smart devices. To enhance 
connected vehicles against multiple types of 
network attacks, Katragadda et al. [29] put for-
ward a sequence mining method to detect low-
speed injection attacks of the tolerance system 
in the control area network (CAN), using four 
types of replay attacks. Their method evaluates 
the effectiveness of each attack with different 
attack features and computing performance. 
Experimental data indicate that the proposed 
method can effectively detect the low-speed 
injection attacks on the tolerance system, and 
greatly improve security of the CAN.
Diddigi et al. [18] put forward a reinforcement 
learning algorithm that tracks intrusions to the 
tolerance system through upper confidence tree 
search. With the aid of Markov decision pro-
cess, the algorithm optimizes the state space 
and the action space by accurately calculating 
sensor data, and pinpoints the intrusion nodes 
in the tolerance system, thereby maintaining the 
network security at a high speed. Ahmadian Ra-
maki et al. [19] proposed an intrusion tolerance 
Markov detection model based on machine 
learning: an isomorphic model was set up to 
quantify the tolerance system and quickly iden-
tify the key nodes being intruded, laying the 
basis for decision-making on network security. 
Miehling et al. [20] proposed an intrusion tol-
erance detection model based on the condition-
al dependency graph. To accurately predict the 
key nodes and enhance maintenance of the tol-
erance system, their model simulates the depen-
dency between security conditions (attacker ca-
pabilities) and attacks, quantifies the state space 
and sets up a predictable Markov decision-mak-
ing process, and calls a scalable online defense 
algorithm to track the defense behaviors.
Mengistu et al. [21] developed a machine 
learning algorithm for load monitoring of the 
online tolerance system. Specifically, event-
based unsupervised profiling and Markov chain 
technology were combined with Markov chain 
technology for system modeling; an additional 
factor Markov model was used to decompose 
the generated parameters of equipment model 
online, and to extract the target nodes, so as 
to optimize the tolerance system. Sethuraman 
et al. [22] proposed a passive intrusion toler-
ance detection model for wireless networks 
that are vulnerable to network intrusions. The 
model relies on hidden Markov technology to 
quantify the initial probabilities, identifies the 
threat nodes in the system through statistical 
and probabilistic analyses on feedback series, 
and makes accurate prediction and maintenance 
to enhance the anti-intrusion capability of the 
wireless network. To cope with Advanced Per-
sistent Threats (APTs), Brogi and Bernardino 
[23] derived a hidden Markov model based 
on APT evolution. An accurate modeling was 
achieved by reconstructing the evolution pro-
cess of attack activities. Expert system and arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) algorithm were integrat-
ed to timely pinpoint potential vulnerabilities of 
idential organizations, Harang and Kott [3] 
proposed a hidden Markov model with restrict-
ed hidden state, which couples Markov chain 
with Monte-Carlo simulation. By analyzing the 
combination of intrusion time series, the pro-
posed model parses and predicts the network 
risks and provides the defense measures.
Drawing on a new feature extraction technol-
ogy, Khreich et al. [4] designed an anomaly 
detection system that reduces the false alarm 
rate of intrusion detection. Their system, which 
integrates the frequency with the time informa-
tion of the system call trajectory, was trained on 
single-class support vector machine (SVM) to 
make accurate forecast of the key points in the 
tolerance system. Rmayti et al. [5] developed 
a fully decentralized intrusion tolerance predic-
tion mechanism, based on the Bernoulli-Bayes-
ian model for node behavior classification and 
the Markov chain model based on behavior evo-
lution tracking. Through NS2 simulation, the 
prediction mechanism was found to accurately 
detect the key nodes that had been invaded in 
the tolerant system, which ensures the reliable 
and safe data packet forwarding between net-
work nodes. Sandhu et al. put forward a Mar-
kov-based intrusion detection framework that 
detects the network intrusions in cloud comput-
ing [6, 7]. By a two-stage Markov model, the 
edge devices were effectively divided into four 
levels, so as to pinpoint the malicious edge de-
vices in cloud computing. The framework was 
later improved by adding virtual honeypots, and 
subject to actual attack tests in a virtual envi-
ronment created by OpenStack and Microsoft 
Azure. Test results show that the improved 
framework can identify malicious devices ef-
fectively, while reducing the false alarm rate.
Marchang et al. [8] presented two Markov-based 
anomaly detection schemes for intrusion toler-
ance systems, including a lightweight intrusion 
detection scheme based on the frequency of sta-
tistical data, and another scheme based on Mar-
kov chain of data orderliness. The two schemes 
were proved valid in anomaly detection for 
intrusion tolerance systems, through simula-
tion and theoretical analysis. Entezari-Maleki 
et al. [9] proposed a two-class random detection 
model to evaluate the mean time for detecting 
intrusion nodes in intrusion tolerance systems. 
Their model simulates each attack with two 
different continuous-time Markov chains, and 
gives the calculation method for mean attack 
detection time. Sadreazami et al. [10] created a 
novel detection framework for distributed blind 
intrusions into intrusion tolerance systems. Un-
der the framework, the values measured by sen-
sors were treated as target image signals, and 
their statistical features were used to detect in-
trusions. Experimental results show that their 
framework outperforms  other schemes of the 
same type in detecting the attacks on intrusion 
tolerance systems.
In view of the lack of an intelligent detection 
algorithm for intrusion tolerance systems, Ha-
jisalem and Babaie [11] combined artificial bee 
colony (ABC) [12, 13] and artificial fish swarm 
(AFS) [14, 15] into a hybrid classification meth-
od. First, the training dataset was segmented by 
fuzzy mean clustering and correlation-based 
feature selection, respectively; the Classifica-
tion and Regression Tree (CART) was imple-
mented to generate If-Then rules based on the 
selected features, so as to distinguish between 
normal records and abnormal intrusion records. 
Simulation results show that the ABC-AFS hy-
brid method outshined traditional methods, and 
achieved the detection rate of 99% and the false 
alarm rate of 0.01%. Allen et al. [16] proposed 
an intrusion tolerance detection model based on 
Bayesian reinforcement learning for preven-
tive maintenance related to network security in 
colleges. In the model, the median estimation 
learning time metric was introduced to eval-
uate the speed of the intrusion tolerance sys-
tem in eliminating parameter uncertainty with 
probability concentrated in a single scenario. 
Compared with the alternatives in numerical 
research, the model was found to have faster 
learning speed and better detection efficiency. 
Based on multiple-detector anomaly detection 
system (ADS), Khreich et al. [17] proposed an 
intrusion detection model for intrusion toler-
ance systems. Using the Boolean combination 
in the working feature space of the receiver, 
the model effectively combines the classifica-
tion results of different detectors to reduce false 
alarm rate. Then, the proposed model was veri-
fied on two large system call datasets generated 
on Linux and Windows. The results showed that 
the model consistently outperformed the single 
best detector and the homogeneous detector in 
intrusion detection.
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3. Finite Automaton Conversion of 
Intrusion Tolerance System
According to the state transition of each node 
in the intrusion tolerance system (Figure 1), the 
state transitions of system nodes reflect that the 
system belongs to the normal state of service 
provision or to the tolerance state after being in-
vaded. Therefore, each system state in Figure 1 
represents a unique working state of the sys-
tem. Since the system provides a limited num-
ber of limited services and working conditions, 
the operation process of the intrusion tolerance 
system could be described by finite automaton. 
Whereas the intrusion into the system is sto-
chastic and unpredictable, the system model is 
non-deterministic: Even if the working state and 
conditional symbols are fixed, the model can-
not be converted to a unique deterministic state. 
Hence, the Non-Deterministic Finite Automaton 
(NDFA) was chosen to formally depict the state 
transition of the intrusion tolerance system.
3.1 The NDFA of Intrusion Tolerance 
System
The NDFA of intrusion tolerance system can be 
formalized as a five-tuple: 
(Q0, Ӂ, Ü, f, F),
where, Q0 ⊆ Ü is the set of nodes with non-emp-
ty initial state; Ӂ is a finite non-empty set of 
input characters, each of which represents a 
possible transition condition of the model; Ü is 
a finite set of nodes with non-empty state, in 
which each element is a state; f is a multi-valued 
mapping and a subset of Ü × Ӂ → Ü; F ⊆ Ü is 
the set of nodes with termination states, which 
can be null.
According to the mapping rules of finite autom-
aton, the mapping f (Q, δ) = Q' can be expressed 
as: when the finite automaton is at the state 
node Q, after the system has received the input 
condition of character δ, the intrusion tolerance 
system model will switch to the state node Q'.
The operation process of the NDFA of the in-
trusion tolerance system can be described by 
the state transition graph and the state transi-
tion table. Suppose there are k state nodes in 
the NDFA, and these nodes have t characters 
about the input conditions of transition. Then, 
the state transition graph of the NDFA will con-
tain k circular nodes, each of which has a max-
imum of t directed arcs pointing towards other 
state nodes. The input condition characters are 
marked on the directed arcs. The state transition 
graph has one and only one initial state node, 
but multiple termination state nodes. Each ter-
mination state node represents a possible termi-
nation state of the intrusion tolerance system.
As shown in Figure 1, the intrusion tolerance 
system can be abstracted as an NDFA = (Ü, Ӂ, 
f, Q0, F), where, Ü = {B, D, I, A, E, R, C, U, O};
Q0 = {B}; F = {B}; Ӂ = {0, ξ, 1}. In the finite
non-empty set Ӂ, if the input condition charac-
ter of a state node in the system equals 1, then 
the security strategy configured at that node 
has been successfully activated; if the character 
equals zero, the strategy has not been activat-
ed, i.e., the strategy has failed; if the character 
equals ξ, the state node has been empty-shifted.
The mapping f: Ü × Ӂ → Ü can be expressed 
as:
f (B, 0) = D, f (B, 1) = B;
f (D, 0) = I, f (D, 1) = B;
f (I, 0) = A, f (I, ξ) = E;
f (A, 0) = U, f (A, 1) = [A, U];
f (E, 0) = O, f (E, 1) = [R, C];
f (R, 0) = U, f (R, 1) = [R, U];
f (C, 0) = U, f (C, 1) = [C, U];
f (O, 1) = B; f (U, 1) = B.
Table 1 sums up the state node transitions under 
different input condition characters.
Table 1. The state transition table of the NDFA of  
intrusion tolerance system.
State Q





A U [A, U]
E O [R, C]
R U [R, U]
C U [C, U]
O B
U B
In this paper, the Scalable Intrusion-Tolerant 
Architecture (SITAR) intrusion tolerance mod-
el is optimized by updating the network security 
strategy, producing an intrusion tolerance finite 
automaton model. Since every node in the mod-
el carries Markov features, the proposed model 
was quantified by the Markov theory. The sta-
ble probability of each state was calculated, and 
used to determine the key nodes of the system. 
Then, the maintenance time of each key node 
was extended, making the system harder to be 
invaded. The research results provide the direc-
tion and theoretical basis for administrators to 
effectively maintain the network.
2. Optimization of Finite Automata 
Model for Intrusion Tolerance  
System
An intrusion tolerance system is an automat-
ic protection system that maintains a network 
server after the network has been invaded, such 
that the network server can continue to provide 
services, while repairing its vulnerabilities. Cur-
rently, there is a wide array of network servers 
and intrusion techniques. Hence, the architec-
ture, security strategy and self-repair algorithm 
of the intrusion tolerance system are highly 
flexible and diverse. To effectively describe the 
function of each node in the system, this paper 
optimizes the SITAR intrusion tolerance model 
by updating the network security strategy, and 
thus proposes an intrusion tolerance finite au-
tomaton model. The overall architecture of the 
proposed model is shown in Figure 1.
The state transition model covers the following 
basic states: health state B, dangerous state D, 
intrusion state I, damage avoidance state A, tol-
erance excitation state E, reduced service state 
R, safe shutdown state C, out of control state O, 
and strategy update state U.
Among them, states A, R, and C are special 
states. Under any of these states, the system 
needs to learn and analyze the intrusion method 
automatically or manually by network admin-
istrators, and then update the network securi-
ty strategy to resume the normal state, laying 
a new basis for system protection in the future. 
When the system is in an unhealthy state, it can 
sometimes restore to state B automatically, and 
sometimes require manual restoration.
The state transition model can handle any un-
known attack, under which the system service 
is similar to any known state. This means that 
the model can deal with unknown forms of at-
tack. By this model, the system operation is 
divided into several states. For each state, the 
corresponding security strategy is available 
to safeguard healthy operation of the system. 
Therefore, the state transition model is both 
flexible and secure.
Figure 1. The state transition process of the intrusion tolerance system model.
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f (E, 0) = O, f (E, 1) = [R, C];
f (R, 0) = U, f (R, 1) = [R, U];
f (C, 0) = U, f (C, 1) = [C, U];
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Table 1 sums up the state node transitions under 
different input condition characters.
Table 1. The state transition table of the NDFA of  
intrusion tolerance system.
State Q





A U [A, U]
E O [R, C]
R U [R, U]
C U [C, U]
O B
U B
In this paper, the Scalable Intrusion-Tolerant 
Architecture (SITAR) intrusion tolerance mod-
el is optimized by updating the network security 
strategy, producing an intrusion tolerance finite 
automaton model. Since every node in the mod-
el carries Markov features, the proposed model 
was quantified by the Markov theory. The sta-
ble probability of each state was calculated, and 
used to determine the key nodes of the system. 
Then, the maintenance time of each key node 
was extended, making the system harder to be 
invaded. The research results provide the direc-
tion and theoretical basis for administrators to 
effectively maintain the network.
2. Optimization of Finite Automata 
Model for Intrusion Tolerance  
System
An intrusion tolerance system is an automat-
ic protection system that maintains a network 
server after the network has been invaded, such 
that the network server can continue to provide 
services, while repairing its vulnerabilities. Cur-
rently, there is a wide array of network servers 
and intrusion techniques. Hence, the architec-
ture, security strategy and self-repair algorithm 
of the intrusion tolerance system are highly 
flexible and diverse. To effectively describe the 
function of each node in the system, this paper 
optimizes the SITAR intrusion tolerance model 
by updating the network security strategy, and 
thus proposes an intrusion tolerance finite au-
tomaton model. The overall architecture of the 
proposed model is shown in Figure 1.
The state transition model covers the following 
basic states: health state B, dangerous state D, 
intrusion state I, damage avoidance state A, tol-
erance excitation state E, reduced service state 
R, safe shutdown state C, out of control state O, 
and strategy update state U.
Among them, states A, R, and C are special 
states. Under any of these states, the system 
needs to learn and analyze the intrusion method 
automatically or manually by network admin-
istrators, and then update the network securi-
ty strategy to resume the normal state, laying 
a new basis for system protection in the future. 
When the system is in an unhealthy state, it can 
sometimes restore to state B automatically, and 
sometimes require manual restoration.
The state transition model can handle any un-
known attack, under which the system service 
is similar to any known state. This means that 
the model can deal with unknown forms of at-
tack. By this model, the system operation is 
divided into several states. For each state, the 
corresponding security strategy is available 
to safeguard healthy operation of the system. 
Therefore, the state transition model is both 
flexible and secure.
Figure 1. The state transition process of the intrusion tolerance system model.
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4.2. Stable Probability of NDFA
In the NDFA of the intrusion tolerance system, 
the stable probability refers to the probability 
that each state is in stable operation. Let Pi be 
the probability that the state transition model of 
the system stabilizes at state i; ∂I be the stabile 
probability of state i in the state transition mod-
el; ρ be the matrix of state transition probabili-
ties of system states. Then, 
∑ Pi = 1, i ∈Ü; 
∂ = [∂B, ∂D, ∂I, ∂E, ∂A, ∂R, ∂C, ∂O, ∂U]. 









                         (1)
The ∂I value satisfies:
1i
i
ρ ∂ = ∂
 ∂ =
∑                            (2)
The risk of intrusion faced by a system, which 
is characterized by intrusion duration and prob-
Figure 2. The isomorphic process of NDFA state transition before and after quantification.
3.2. Workflow of the NDFA of Intrusion 
Tolerance System
The initial state node of the NDFA is B. At this 
time, the model of intrusion tolerance system 
has just started, and the system belongs to the 
original state of service provision. Intruders 
will manipulate the intrinsic vulnerabilities of 
the system. Once an intrusion takes place, the 
NDFA will shift from state node B to state node 
D, i.e., to the dangerous state.
When the system arrives at the state node D, 
the intruder has just succeeded in launching the 
invasion, without causing serious damages to 
the application services or to security strategy 
of the system. If the administrator identifies the 
intrusion and takes measures to contain it time-
ly, the system will soon return to the health state 
node B. Otherwise, the system will move from 
state node D to the intrusion sate node I.
When the system arrives at the state node I, 
some applications or functions of the network 
will be damaged by the intruder. The damages 
might be slight or serious. The degree of dam-
age directly bears on the subsequent operations 
of the system. If service abnormalities of the 
system are not noticed by the administrator, but 
detected and controlled/eliminated by the fault 
tolerance mechanism in the system, the system 
will switch into the damage avoidance state 
node A; If service abnormalities of the system 
are detected, the system will switch into the tol-
erance excitation state node E, kicking off the 
tolerance mechanism automatically. Based on 
the judgment of the mechanism, the system will 
automatically move to the reduced service state 
node R or safe shutdown state node C.
If service abnormalities of the system are de-
tected without triggering the tolerance mecha-
nism, the system will switch to the out of control 
state node O. Under this state, the administrator 
should be notified to take manual measures of 
maintenance and manually intervene in the sys-
tem operations.
When the system returns to health state node B 
from A, R or C, the strategy update state node 
U will learn about the intrusion and update the 
security strategy, thereby enhancing the anti-in-
trusion capability of the system and making the 
system better prepared against future intru-
sions.
4. Markov Quantification of the NDFA
4.1. State Node Transform Model
Since each node in the NDFA of the intrusion 
tolerance system carries Markov features, the 
system state could be quantified by Markov 
theory to facilitate further analysis. The state of 
the NDFA can be further determined as 
 Ü = {B, D, I, A, E, R, C, U, O}, 
 Q0 = {B}, and 
 F = {B}. 
The state transition probability can be ex-
pressed as ρi, where i ∈Ü. Then, the input con-
dition character table Ӂ of the NDFA can be 
further quantified from {0, 1, ξ} into 
{ρb, ρbd, ρdb, ρdi, ρie, ρia, ρeo, ρec, ρer, 
 ρa, ρr, ρc, ρru, ρcu, ρau, ρub, ρob}. 
The isomorphic process of NDFA state transi-
tion before and after quantification is shown in 
Figure 2.
According to Markov theory, the state transi-































− − − − − − − 
 − − − − − − − 
 − − − − − − −
 − − − − − − =  − − − − − − −
 
− − − − − − − 
 − − − − − − −
 
− − − − − − − − 
 − − − − − − − − 
According to the actual situation and Markov 
theory, there exist the following relationships 
in matrix ρ: ρdb = 1 - ρdi, ρie = 1 - ρia, and 
ρeo = 1 - ρer - ρec. After introducing the state 
transition probability matrix ρ, the NDFA mod-
el satisfies the relationship: 
f (Q, ρi) = Üρ, 
where, Q ∈Ü, and ρi ∈Ӂ.
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As shown in Figure 3, each server in the tol-
erance system contains lots of vulnerabilities. 
The probability that these vulnerabilities are 
successfully utilized by the intruder is 
ρdi = 0.5; 
the probability that these vulnerabilities are de-
tected and repaired timely by the system is 
ρdb = 1 - ρdi = 0.5; 
the probability that the intrusion is detected and 
avoided by the system is 
ρia = 0.4.
According to Markov theory, the probability 
that the intrusion tolerance system detects the 
intrusion and triggers the security strategy is 
ρie = 1 - ρia = 0.6; 
the probability that the system detects the in-
trusion and adopts a reduced service strategy is 
ρer = 0.5; 
the probability that the system detects the in-
trusion and terminates the provision of network 
services is 
ρec = 0.4; 
the probability that the system is damaged by 
the intrusion and forced to terminate service 
provision is 
ρeo = 1 - ρer - ρec = 0.1.
Survey results show that, among all states, the 
model spends a relatively long time at state T. 
Hence, it was assumed that tB = 1.0, and tD = 1.8. 
The intrusion was detected after tI = 0.4. Then, 
the system state switched from I to A. State A 
was noticed after tA = 0.5. Only through strate-
gy learning could state A move back to state B. 
The strategy learning consumed tU = 0.5. Un-
der state E, the transition direction was deter-
mined by the tolerance strategy. Hence, it was 
assumed that tE = 0.2, tR = 4.0, tC = 1.5, and 
tO = 2.5. Note that all ti (i ∈Ü ) variables are time 
units. The maintenance time of each state node 
is illustrated in Figure 4.
According to the maintenance time ti of the sys-
tem (Figure 4), distribution of the stable prob-
ability Pi for each state in the tolerance system 
can be obtained by formulas (1)-(3) (Figure 5).
As shown in Figure 5, the stable probabilities of 
different states can be ranked in descending or-
der as {B, D, R, U, I, C, A, O, E}. Among them, 
at states U and O, the system cannot return to 
state B without manual intervention. Hence, the 
stable probabilities of the two states have noth-
ing to do with the maintenance of network se-
curity, and could therefore be neglected. Hence, 
the key state nodes of the system could be de-
fined as {B, D, R}. By extending the mainte-
nance time t of these state nodes, the invasion 
tolerance system could be more reliable. In this 
way, the invasion will be more difficult to im-
plement, and more likely to be prevented.
Figure 3. Network topology of the state transition model for intrusion tolerance system.
ability of successful intrusion, depends on the 
intrusion ability and technical level of the in-
truder, and on the defensive measures taken by 
the administrator. As a result, it is a complex 
process to model the network intrusion process. 
To reduce the complexity, the intrusion risk 
was described by the mean maintenance time 
of each system state. Let {tB, tD, tI, tE, tA, tR, tC, 
tO, tU} be the mean maintenance time of each 
state. After introducing parameter T, the stable 














B ob ub bd db B
D bd D
I bd di I
E bd di ie E
A bd di ia A
C bd di ie eo C
R bd di ie er R
C bd di ie ec C
U bd di ia au bd di ie er ru


















ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
















bd D db H
di I ia A au U
ie E eo O ec C cu U
er R ru U
t t
t t t























 + + + +
 + + + + +
 + +
The greater the stable probability of each state 
node, the longer the intrusion tolerance system 
remains in safe operation, the higher the cost of 
intrusion, and the safer the system.
5. Simulation and Results Analysis
5.1. Environment Construction
Based on the features of the state transition 
model for intrusion tolerance system, the net-
work topology was plotted as shown in Figure 3, 
where server S1 (E-mail server), S2 (Web serv-
er), and S3 (database server) constitute a com-
plete intrusion tolerance system. The system 
adopts a unified security strategy to provide 
network services.
The main servers in the network environment 
(Figure 3) were subject to vulnerability scan. 
Then, the vulnerabilities of each server were 
identified (Table 2).
Table 2. Vulnerabilities of the devices in the  
tolerance system.
Device 
number Operating system Vulnerability
S1 Windows Server 2003
CVE-2007-0038
CVE-2004-0893
S2 Windows Server 2003
CVE-2008-0702
CVE-2004-2575
S3 Windows Server 2003
CVE-2006-2379
CVE-2002-0364
5.2. Test on System Model and Data 
Analysis
Through active attacks, this paper obtains rele-
vant data on intrusion into the tolerance system 
model and organizes these data into the state 
transition probability matrix ρ of the NDFA. 
The system can operate at state nodes B, R, C, 
and A, that is, 
ρb = ρa = ρr = ρc = 1. 
For simplicity, these state nodes were ignored, 
i.e., it was assumed that 
ρb = ρd = ρr = ρc = 0. 
Moreover, the system  will resume operation 
after being maintained by the administrator. 
Hence, 
ρub = ρob = ρau = ρru = ρcu = 1. 
Since the system inevitably has vulnerabilities 
and the vulnerabilities will eventually be dis-
covered by the intruder, we have 
ρbd = 1.
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intrusion, and the safer the system.
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Analysis
Through active attacks, this paper obtains rele-
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and A, that is, 
ρb = ρa = ρr = ρc = 1. 
For simplicity, these state nodes were ignored, 
i.e., it was assumed that 
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6. Conclusion
The intrusion tolerance system is the third-gen-
eration core technology of network security 
maintenance, serving as the last line of defense 
for network security. The system plays an im-
portant role in network security management 
and attracts much attention from network secu-
rity experts. By updating the security strategy, 
this paper optimizes the existing SITAR intru-
sion tolerance model and proposes an intrusion 
tolerance finite automaton. The proposed mod-
el was quantified by Markov theory, the stabili-
ty probability was calculated for each state, and 
the key state nodes of the tolerance system were 
determined as {B, D, R}. If the maintenance 
time at key state nodes is extended, it will be 
more difficult to invade the system, and the sys-
tem model will become more secure. The future 
research will further improve the feasibility and 
reduce maintenance time of the system model 
by dynamically maintaining  vulnerabilities and 
updating  security strategy in the intrusion tol-
erance system.
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6. Conclusion
The intrusion tolerance system is the third-gen-
eration core technology of network security 
maintenance, serving as the last line of defense 
for network security. The system plays an im-
portant role in network security management 
and attracts much attention from network secu-
rity experts. By updating the security strategy, 
this paper optimizes the existing SITAR intru-
sion tolerance model and proposes an intrusion 
tolerance finite automaton. The proposed mod-
el was quantified by Markov theory, the stabili-
ty probability was calculated for each state, and 
the key state nodes of the tolerance system were 
determined as {B, D, R}. If the maintenance 
time at key state nodes is extended, it will be 
more difficult to invade the system, and the sys-
tem model will become more secure. The future 
research will further improve the feasibility and 
reduce maintenance time of the system model 
by dynamically maintaining  vulnerabilities and 
updating  security strategy in the intrusion tol-
erance system.
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